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Abstract 
Using China as a test case, this paper empirically investigates how the development of 
financial intermediation affects rural-urban income disparity (RUID). Using 20-year 
province level panel data, we find that the level of financial development is positively 
correlated with RUID. Examining two subperiods, 1978-88 and 1989-98, we test several 
competing hypotheses that may affect RUID. We find that the increase of RUID may be 
explained by fiscal policy during the first period and financial intermediates during the 
second period. In addition, we show that the direction of the Kuznets effect on RUID is 
sensitive to changes in government development policies. The rural development policies 
during the first period may have enhanced the rural development and reduced RUID. 
However, the financial intermediary policy during the second period focused on urban 
development and increased both urban growth and intra-urban inequalities, thus leading to 
an increase in RUID. Finally, we show that RUID is insensitive to the provincial industrial 
structure (the share of primary industry in GDP). These results are consistent with the 
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traditional urban-bias hypothesis and are robust to the inclusion of controls for endogeneity 
issues. This study adds to the economic inequality literature by clarifying the effects of 
government policies on the underlying dynamics on convergent and divergent effects on 
rural-urban inequality. 
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Financial development and its relationship to economic growth has been a growing 
research area. Financial systems may contribute to economic growth by mobilizing and 
pooling savings, diversifying investment risks, screening investment projects, 
facilitating exchange, monitoring managers and exerting corporate control. Empirical 
evidence also supports the argument that fiscal policies have a profound effect on 
economic development (Goldsmith 1969; McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1969; Stiglitz 1985; 
Mayer 1990; King and Levine 1993a, 1993b; Beck and Levine 2002). 
The study of the relationship between economic growth and income inequality has a 
long history and was pioneered by Kuznets’ seminal paper (1955) on the subject.1 
However, relatively few studies focus on the relationship between financial 
development and income distribution. The study by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) is 
the first to explore the association between economic growth, financial development and 
income distribution, where income distribution is treated as exogenous. Galor and Zeira 
(1993), and Banerjee and Newman (1993) maintain that the initial income gap would 
not be reduced unless financial markets (especially the credit market) are well 
developed. The latest study by Clark, Xu and Zou (2003), using cross-country data, 
explores how financial development influences income distribution. They find that 
financial development robustly reduces the level of income inequality. 
In this paper we use panel data on China’s 28 provinces for the period of 1978-98 to 
analyse the effect of the development of financial intermediation on rural-urban income 
inequality (RUID). Using two-way fixed effects estimation, two fixed effects 
instrumental variable estimation, and general method of moment (GMM), we find that 
the financial development index (measured as the ratio of total loans to GDP, as 
extended by financial intermediates) has contributed significantly to the increase of 
rural-urban income disparity since the late 1980s. This is the case even after controlling 
for other factors such as provincial infrastructure, institutional transition in rural areas, 
and degree of international integration, and other related variables. The major driving 
force of RUID is the government’s growing reliance on the financial system since the 
late 1980s to regulate the economy, whereas before that time fiscal policy was the 
principal policy instrument. In addition, we show that the positive correlation of 
provincial financial intermediation with RUID is robust to sector structure changes in 
the province. 
We also show that the central government’s choice of development policies may have 
different effects on the underlying inequality in different sectors. This might facilitate 
the emergence of the Kuznets effect, a negative relationship between square of GDP and 
RUID. These governmental development policies may influence growth, intra-urban 
inequality, and intra-rural inequality in different sectors over different periods. In China, 
these policies may include the household responsibility system, rural industrialization, 
and financial intermediation. In particular, we show that a convergence of (negative 
relation) Kuznets effect, reducing RUID during 1978-88, which was a period of high 
                                                 
1  The inverse U-shaped ‘Kuznets’ curve’ describes the convergence of inequality between two sectors 
(urban and rural) during a period of economic growth. The urban-rural income disparity (RUID) may 
first diverge due high levels of urban economy and urban inequality relative to the rural sector. The 
convergence of inequality will then be the result of industrialization and urbanization at a later stage 
(Kuznets 1955: 17-8).  
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agricultural growth and the development of the township and village enterprises (TVEs) 
narrowed the rural-urban gap in GDP. However, a divergence of (positive relation) 
Kuznets’ effect might have occurred during 1989-98. This period is characterized by 
urban reform and urban-biased policies such as investment and other government policy 
developments that increased urban growth and urban inequality, while the agricultural 
sector stagnated during the period. The two effects jointly caused the increase of RUID 
and revised the Kuznets’ effect.  
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a brief discussion of why a 
single-country case makes sense, and the benefits of using China for our study. Next we 
take a look at how hypotheses such as financial intermediation development, sources of 
growth, and government polices might have affected changes in RUID in China. We 
continue with specifics on our model and data, and we follow-up with the estimation 
strategy and results. We then consider how our findings relate to the Kuznets 
hypothesis, and offer a brief conclusion.  
2  China as a case for testing competing hypotheses on RUID 
According to some recent studies, China’s rural-urban income inequality constitutes the 
most significant component of overall income inequality.2 We use China as a country 
case to examine the effect of financial intermediation development on the within-
country rural-urban income disparity, as opposed to cross-country analyses. We argue 
that there are at least three advantages of studying the effect through a country case. 
First, in cross-country comparisons the differences in institutions, culture and legal 
systems among countries are difficult to control for. In addition, problems in data 
collecting and processing methodology make the income distribution comparison 
between countries less credible (Wei and Wu 2001; Atkinson and Brandolini 2001).3  
Second, using a single country can help to resolve some of the debate on the 
convergence effect of financial intermediation on inequality: the Kuznets’ curve.4 
Kuznets (1955: 14-6) argues that urbanization is a result of rural-urban migration, but 
Anand and Kanbur (1993) point out that the interaction between population shifts and 
                                                 
2   Tsui (1993) decomposes regional disparity into five elements, namely (i) within-province disparity, 
(ii) between-province disparity, (iii) within-countryside-area disparity, (iv) within-urban-area disparity 
and (v) rural-urban disparity. He notes that rural-urban disparity has played a leading role in the 
growth of regional disparity. The World Bank (1997), using China’s 1995 data, concludes that no less 
than half of overall income disparity can be explained by rural-urban income disparity. By using Theil 
decomposition method, Lin, Cai and Li (1998) also find that rural-urban per capita income disparity 
explains at least 50 per cent of overall regional disparity, while the within-rural disparity and within-
urban-area disparity account for the other half. 
3   Knight and Song (2001) also argue that China is a good country case for studying economic 
inequality. 
4   One of the key assumptions of Kuznet’s hypothesis on the convergence of inequality between sectors 
is the difference in the inequality levels of the urban and rural settings. Postulating that urban settings 
have higher inequality than rural areas, Kuznet then analyses the impact of overall inequality during 
periods of economic growth.  
3 
income inequality may be far more complex than Kuznets’ assumption and may obscure 
the results.  
Third, government policy may affect the magnitude and direction of inequality in a 
country. Endowed with large regional variation, China constitutes good case for a cross-
country analysis of a country with similar initial background. Similar initial background 
is an essential element for a comparative study that most cross-country studies generally 
lack (Kanbur 2000: 84). The common background of regions within a country makes 
the evaluation of government policy more effective and helps to clearly identify the 
implications of policy on inequality (Kanbur 2000: 17, 31).  
3  The development of RUID in China (1978-98) and the conflicting hypotheses  
In this section we include a brief review of the evolution of RUID from 1978 to 1998 in 
China. We also discuss several competing hypotheses with regard to the causes of 
RUID. 
China’s economic growth rate has been remarkable, averaging nearly 10 per cent since 
the early 1980s. However, income inequality, especially rural-urban income inequality, 
is a pressing issue and has become even more so in recent years. As an important policy 
concern, RUID may affect the livelihoods of most peasants as well as stability of the 
society, as China is still arguably a developing county with large agricultural sector. In 
Figure 1, we present the evolution of rural-urban income disparity (measured as the 
ratio of disposable income of urban residents to net income of rural residents) across 28 
provinces for the years 1978-98. It is clear that rural-urban income disparity declined in 
the early 1980s, but has increased from the late 1980s. In the late 1990s, RUID in many 
provinces exceeded even that of the late 1970s when market reform was initiated. For 
instance, Beijing’s RUID rose from 1.63 in 1978 to 2.11 in 1998. In the central province 
of Anhui, the gap rose from 1.72 to 2.56 for the same period, while in the northeast 
province of Jilin, it rose from 0.97 to 1.76. A cross-province comparison shows that 
there is a negative correlation between disparity and per capita income (measured in 
1978 yuan, Figure 2). These findings are supported by other researchers in the field (Hu, 
Wang and Kang 1995; Wei Houkai 1997; Zhang 2000). 
We are concerned with the following questions: First, since the urban-biased policies 
pursued by the Chinese authority have not profoundly changed over last two decades, 
how well does the ‘simple’ urban-bias argument fit with the dynamic changes in the 
effects of the development of financial intermediation on RUID? Second, what are the 
government policies and/or sources of growth that might have an impact on RUID? In 
the following, we highlight some competing hypotheses regarding the source of growth 
and its relation with RUID, which we test in this paper. 
3.1  Financial intermediation development 
The development of financial intermediation under the monopolized banking system in 
China may have had an effect on RUID.5 China maintains a monopolized bank-based 
                                                 
5  Appendices 1 and 2 provide a detailed report on historical development of financial structure in China 
during the 1990s and government regulations on the rural financial system, respectively.  
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financial structure in which the four state-owned banks (SCBs) together account for 
two-thirds of the financial assets (IFC 2000). Of these SCBs, only the Agricultural Bank 
of China (ABC) has the mandate to provide loans to the agricultural sector, but in 
practice very few farmers get financial support directly from ABC. Most farm loans are 
financed through rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) but even these are directed primarily 
toward ventures rather than individual farmers. Despite their name, even the RCCs have 
been shown to have an urban bias in their lending structure (Sheng 2001). Our objective 
is to investigate the role of financial intermediation on RUID, a research area that has 
received too little attention. Research has shown that a significant urban-bias has 
emerged in the Chinese financial system (see also Wei, S.-J. 1997). Our paper focuses 
on testing the changing effects of financial intermediation on RUID under this 
monopolized banking system during the marketization period that signified the 
government’s reliance on the banking system as a means of fiscal policy instrument. 
3.2  Rural reform and open door policies 
The rural reform and open door policies initiated in the 1980s certainly may have played 
an important role in China’s RUID. Kanbur and Zhang (2003) use a longer provincial-
level panel to analyse regional inequality in China from 1952 to 2000.6 They argue that 
the great famine of the late 1950s and the cultural revolution during the late 1960s and 
1970s introduced increases in inequality. They also argue that heavy industrialization 
increased rural-urban inequality during the pre-reform period, and that the recent policy 
of decentralization and openness has increased coastal versus inland income disparity. 
In this regard, it is in our interest to test how rural reform, openness, FDI, and trade 
have affected RUID since reform in the 1980s. We also assess the contribution of the 
three municipal-level cities (Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai)7 to RUID. 
3.3  Urban biased policies and industrial structural change 
Urban biased policies and industrial structural change may also have had an effect on 
RUID. Yang (1999) argues that urban-biased policies may have generated long-term 
regional disparity. Lu and Wang (2002) argue along similar lines, attributing the uneven 
regional development to differences in regional production factors and the legacy of 
colonial history in the coastal area, particularly the presence of industrial infrastructure. 
Yang and Wei (1995) also show that the average annual growth rates of GNP and 
industrial gross output values in inland regions have been lower than those in coastal 
regions since 1980. Using regional GDP as well as the GDP of three industrial sectors, 
Huang et al. (2003) show that underdevelopment of the secondary industry may have 
contributed to the increasing regional inequality. Therefore, we test the effect of rural 
finance, fiscal policy, and industrial structure on RUID. 
 
                                                 
6  They employ an alternative inequality index, a member of the decomposable generalized entropy class 
of inequality measure, pioneered by Shorrocks (1980, 1984).  
7  In the empricial analysis Chongqing is also included in the data for Sichuan province.  
5 
4  Model specification and data 
We want to test empirically several competing hypotheses with the following equation. 
In particular, we would like to test the relationship in China between the gap in RUID 
and financial development while taking other potential factors into account. Our basic 
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where subscript i and t denote ith province and tth year respectively. ε  is the error term 
with the standard normal distribution of N (0,δ
2). Dependent variable RUID is the value 
of the ratio of urban per capita disposable income to rural per capita net income. We use 
it to gauge the RUID gap.  
We test several competing hypotheses here with independent variables at the right side 
of the equation and see how those factors affect RUID in China. 
PERGDP and PERGDP
2 are the values of real per capita GDP (in 1978 prices) at 
provincial level and its square term, respectively. We add the square of PERGDP to see 
whether there is Kuznets’ effect, namely an inverted u-shaped relationship between 
income inequality and income level.  
FINDEV is the value of the ratio of loans to GDP, loans extended by financial 
intermediation in one province. We use this variable to measure the development of 
financial intermediation at the province level. We expect FINDEV to increase RUID 
over the period in general, but particularly during second period, 1990 to 1998, when 
China expanded financial intermediation through the monopolized banking system. In 
this regard, we expect the coefficient of FINDEV, namely α3, to be positive and 
statistically significant. 
AGRFINDEV is the value of the share of formal institutional loans to agriculture sectors 
in total loans. We argue that the sign and significance of α4, the coefficient of 
AGRFINDEV, cannot be predetermined since the data on AFINDEV probably do not 
reflect the actual amount of loans to agricultural sectors.  
D  is a vector of control variables for government development policies (or the 
conditioning information set) which include: EXPORT/GDP, the ratio of the total value 
of export to GDP at the province level; FD/GDP, the ratio of the volume of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to GDP at the province level. EXPORT/GDP and FDI/GDP 
represent the international integration level. With these two variables, we can test 
whether international integration affects RUID. Jones, Li and Owen (2003), using city-
level data, establish a link between the special economic zones (SEZs) and ‘growth 
enhancing’ FDI. 
REFORM is the proportion of farm households adopting the ‘household responsibility 
system’ in a province, used to measure the progress of the rural household responsibility 
reform in a province. It needs to be noted that in 1987 all rural households had adopted 
the household responsibility system, therefore REFORM is 1 since then.   
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FISCAL_AGR is the log value of the share of fiscal funds supporting agricultural 
production in total fiscal expenditures. FISCAL/GDP is the log value of the ratio of 
fiscal expenditures to GDP. We add this variable to the model to compare the effect of 
FINDEV with the effects of government’s fiscal policy in different periods.8  
Data for 28 Chinese provinces for the period -98 are used in the empirical analysis.9 All 
data are collected from Liu (2002) and The Compilation of Statistic Data of New China 
for 1978-1999 (SCB 2000). Variables and data resources are listed in Appendix 3.  
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistical results of some principal variables for the period 
1978-99. As can be clearly seen, RUID is on average the variable with the greatest 
deviation. The province of Gansu has the largest value for RUID, 3.04, while Shanghai 
has the smallest. It is also obvious that provinces with higher per capita income also 
exhibit lower RUID values. In addition, Tianjin with a value of 1.98 has the highest 
level of FINDEV compared to Zhejiang province, which has the lowest value, 0.448. 
5 Estimation  strategy 
To estimate equation (4.1), we first present results using OLS method with two-way 
fixed effects which control for the province dummy and time dummy simultaneously. 
However, the results of the traditional OLS method are efficient and consistent only 
when explanatory variables are exogenous. In equation (4.1), some explanatory 
variables, among them especially FINDEV, are assumed to be endogenous variables. To 
address this problem, we then present results from the system generalized methods of 
moments (GMM) estimation.  
In a system GMM, the first difference GMM estimator takes the first difference of the 
proposed equation in order to remove the fixed individual effects from the equation. 
And under the assumption that there is no serial correlation in the error term, the lagged 
levels of the explanatory variables can be used as instruments of the first differenced 
variables. This method has the advantage of avoiding the biases related to omitted 
specific individual effects and to control for endogeneity arising from bi-directional 
causality. However, in the case of highly persistent data, lagged variables in levels are 
likely to be weak instruments for contemporaneous differences, making first-difference 
GMM estimators biased (Blundell and Bond 1998). Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) 
therefore recommend the use of the so-called System-GMM estimator (Arellano and 
Bover 1995) in which we use lagged levels as instruments for contemporaneous 
differences and lagged differences as instruments for contemporaneous levels. 
According to results from the Monte Carlo experiment, the SYS-GMM estimator 
                                                 
8  Due to potential problems of simultaneity, the estimation does not include an urbanization index for 
the provinces. If, however, urbanization is measured as the ratio of the proportion of urban population 
in the total population of a province, inclusion of this variable does not change the estimation results 
much. 
9  Due to data limitations, two provinces, namely Hainan and Tibet, are not included.  
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performs substantially better than the standard differenced GMM estimator, especially 
when data are highly persistent.10 
6 Estimation  results 
6.1  Basic estimation results 
Table 3 reports several results based on the two-way fixed effects estimation, and 
system GMM estimation, respectively. Some statistical test values relating to model 
specification show that the statistical property of econometric model is very good. For 
example, adjusted R
2 values in TWFE are high and Sargan test values in GMM also fail 
to reject the null hypothesis that lagged values are appropriate instruments. 
The focus of our analysis is on the effect of FINDEV, the proxy for the development of 
financial intermediation. The coefficient is consistently significant at 1 per cent level in 
all OLS estimations (columns 1-4). After controlling set D is included in the GMM 
regression, the coefficient of FINDEV becomes significant at the 10 per cent level.11 In 
addition, the value of the estimated coefficient of FINDEV increases around 40 per cent 
compared to OLS results after accounting for endogenous effects. In general, these 
results are consistent with our expectation that financial development on the whole 
contributes to the expansion of RUID. 
To investigate the Kuzents effect, we look at the both OLS and system GMM, the signs 
of the estimated coefficients of PERGDP and its square term are positive and negative, 
respectively, and both coefficients are significant at 1 per cent or 5 per cent level, 
suggesting that there is an inverted-U shaped curve relationship between per capita 
income and RUID.  
We now turn to the variables for rural development policies. The estimated coefficient 
(α4) for the proportion of agricultural loans is not significantly different from zero, 
indicating that agricultural loans did not significantly affect RUID. These results again 
confirm our argument that China’s formal financial intermediation is inefficient in 
providing financial services to the agricultural sectors. As expected, the coefficient of 
REFORM is significantly negative in OLS estimation results (column 3), indicating that 
agricultural deregulation did facilitate the fall in RUID.  
For the openness and FDI hypothesis, FDI/GDP has a significant positive coefficient in 
the OLS result. This result is consistent with the geographic distribution of FDI which 
tends to benefit urban areas more. On the other hand, after controlling for endogenous 
effects in GMM, both household responsibility system (HRS) and FDI lose their 
significance.  
                                                 
10  In econometric models, the GMM method has the advantage of avoiding biases related to omitted 
specific individual effects and controlling for endogeneity arising from bi-directional causality. For 
details, see Arellano and Bond (1991). 
11 As far as the results in system GMM without controlling for the set D are concerned, the estimated 
coefficient of FINDEV  is not significant in column 2 despite its positive sign. This may well, 
however, be a case of a missing variable.  
8 
Government fiscal policy cam also be an important factor. What intrigues us is the 
coefficient of FISCAL/GDP, in both OLS and system GMM, which has the expected 
positive sign and is very significant. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients of 
FISCAL/GDP is bigger than those of FINDEV, which indicates that the impact of fiscal 
means is greater than that of financial intermediation. 
So far we have explored an overall effect of the development of financial intermediation 
on  RUID for the period of 1978-98. However, we want to see whether there is a 
difference in this effect prior to and after the late 1980s period. We argue that it was not 
until the late 1980s that the Chinese government used banks as their principal policy 
instrument to regulate the economy. Therefore we split the sample duration into two 
parts; the decade from 1978 to 1988 and from 1989 to 1998.  
6.2 The  effects  of  FINDEV in the different periods 
Tables 4 and 5 present estimation results for the two subperiods, 1978-89 and 1990-98, 
respectively. It must be noted that because the value of REFORM will be time-invariant 
after 1987, this variable will not be included in the regression for the 1989-98 decade 
due to the collinearity problem. 
The results of the estimated coefficient of FINDEV in Tables 4 and 5 robustly and 
consistently suggest that the effect of FINDEV is significant only in the 1989-98 period, 
while in the decade of 1978-88 the effect is not significant. We expect that this is 
because around the year 1989, rural reform stalled and policy priority was targeted 
towards urban sector reform. Regulations for rural economy and rural financial system 
were tightened again, thus the RUID gap would predictably be increasing since then.  
The sign of the coefficients of Ln(PERGDP) and its square term are significantly 
positive and negative, respectively, in the first period (Table 4), but the sign is reversed 
in the second period (Table 5). This implies that the inverted-U curve relationship 
between  RUID and level of economic development has changed to a U-curve 
(diverging) relationship in the second period. The cause of this fundamental change may 
due to the fact that economic growth shifted from rural regions (agricultural) to urban 
areas (financial) during the transition from the first period to the second. 
In addition, while the effect of EXPORT/GDP is significantly negative only during the 
first subperiod, FDI/GDP has a significantly positive coefficient in both subperiods. 
This probably suggests that exploitation of the comparative advantage in terms of 
foreign trade significantly reduced RUID only in the 1980s.12 
Moreover, in section 2 we argue that over the two periods, the government shifted from 
fiscal policy to financial system in the implementation of its policy goals. If our 
argument is true, we would expect the estimated effects of fiscal policy in the first 
period (1978-89) to be significant on RUID and to be greater than those induced by the 
                                                 
12 A possible explanation is that since late the 1980s, labour migration from rural to urban areas to look 
for jobs has become more popular. A great number of rural workers are concentrated in the relatively 
developed coastal provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu, Beijing, Shanghai, and so on, where international 
trade volume is higher.  
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development of financial intermediation, whereas in the second period (1990-98) these 
effects should be smaller and likely to be insignificant.  
In the full sample regressions, the results in Table 3 show that the overall effect of fiscal 
policy on RUID for the total sample period is highly significant and larger than that of 
the development of financial intermediation. However, if the period is divided into two 
subperiods, as in Tables 4 and 5, a different picture emerges. For the 1978-89 period, 
the estimated coefficient of FISCAL/GDP is significant and bigger than that of FINDEV 
(columns 3 and 4, Table 4). But for the 1990-98 period, the estimated coefficient of 
FINDEV is significant and larger than that of FISCAL/GDP, and the latter loses its 
significance (columns 3 and 4, Table 5).  
We conclude that both the development of financial intermediation and fiscal policy 
contribute to the growing RUID, but the former plays a leading role in the 1990s, 
whereas the latter is the most prominent factor in the 1980s. These results are consistent 
with our theoretical argument. 
To be more specific, in the early 1980s, urban residents were granted living allowances 
by the government even though procurement prices for many agricultural products were 
considerably eased. The proportion of fiscal funds in total fiscal expenditures supporting 
agricultural development (FISCAL_AGR) is very small (3 per cent on average). Thus 
even in the early 1980s, fiscal policy contributed significantly to the growing RUID. 
Since the late 1980s, the government has increased its support to agricultural 
development only slightly (9 per cent on average in terms of FISCAL_AGR), and at the 
same time changed its principal policy instrument from fiscal policy to financial policy. 
The results are given in Tables 4 and 5. 
6.3  Extended model specification and results 
The approach outlined so far enables us only to identify an overall and direct effect of 
FINDEV on RUID. However, such analysis does not allow us to simultaneously identify 
the effects of both financial intermediation and structural characteristics of the 
economy. For example, in a province with a higher share of agriculture output in GDP, 
will the RUID gap be larger or smaller when the banks lend more (Clark, Xu and Zou 
2003)? In order to examine these effects, we modify our basic model specification of 
equation (4.1) by adding the interaction between FINDEV and the variables considered 
to reflect the structural features of the economy. 





ln( ) ln( ) (ln( ))
*/ /
it it it it it
jj i t
URID C PERGDP PERGDP FINDEV AGRFINDEV
FINDEV AGR GDP AGR GDP D
αα α α
αα β ε
=+⋅ + ⋅ +⋅ + ⋅
+⋅ +⋅ + ⋅+ ∑
 (6.1) 
where AGR/GDP is the share of primary industry’s GDP in total GDP. Kuznets (1955) 
argues that income inequality increases as people move from the low-income, but more 
egalitarian, agricultural sector to the high-income, but less egalitarian, industrial sector. 
In other words, income inequality depends on the sectoral structure of an economy. In 
order to control for this effect, we add AGR/GDP to equation (4.1).   
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We also add an interaction term  */ FINDEV AGR GDP to equation (4.1). As Clarke, 
Xu and Zou (2003) argue, sector structure will affect the impact financial depth has on 
inequality.13 In their paper, these authors assert that if entry into a modern sector 
(industry and service) is made easier when access to finance is easier, then inequality 
should be greater in economies with larger modern sectors. Consequently, inequality 
should be higher in countries with large modern sectors and greater financial depth than 
in countries with only one (or neither) of these characteristics.14 As far as the 
relationship between RUID, financial development and sector structure is concerned, if 
Clarke, Xu and Zou’s augmented Kuznets’ hypothesis is right, the estimated coefficient 
of  */ FINDEV AGR GDP should be negative and statistically significant; on the other 
hand, we believe this interaction term can also be used as a vehicle to test whether the 
urban-bias hypothesis pertains to the relationship between RUID and financial 
development. If urban bias does exist, the coefficient on the interaction term should be 
insignificant (financial intermediation will be insensitive to variations in sector 
structure). The estimation results of equation (6.1) are reported in Table 6.  
We can see from the results in most regressions (except for column 4) that  6 α  is 
significantly negative, which is consistent with the finding in Clarke, Xu and Zou 
(2003), and thus supports the Kuzents hypothesis that RUID increases during the 
transition from agriculture to modern industry. Moreover, our analysis focuses on the 
signs and significance level of 3 α and 5 α . While  3 α is still significant during the second 
subperiod (columns 5 and 6),  5 α is insignificant in all regressions. These results seem to 
support the urban-bias hypothesis, as opposed to the Kuzents hypothesis since the 
effects of FINDEV do not depend on changes in industrial structure. In addition, results 
in Table 5 substantiate the affirmation that the impacts of financial intermediation on 
RUID are mainly observed in the 1990s 
The above results of Tables 3-6 are based on a sample of 28 provinces. However, we 
doubt whether the financial intermediation effects of the three municipalities—Beijing, 
Tianjin and Shanghai—are different from that of the other provinces in terms of policy 
settings. For political purposes, particularly to maintain a stable political environment, 
the central government extends more preferential policies to the three municipalities to 
mobilize all possible resources to ensure the development of these cities. This includes 
maintaining RUID at a low level. In order to test whether there is a structural difference 
in the impact of financial intermediation between other provinces and the three 
municipals (Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai), we re-run the regressions using model 
specifications (6.2) and (6.4), corresponding to the specification (4.1) and (6.1) 
respectively. We wish to see whether the effects of intermediation undergo a change as 
a result of provincial structure differences, which are measured by the sign and 
significance level of the new interaction terms (PD*FINDEV, PD* 
(AGR/GDP*FINDEV)). 
                                                 
13 Yang and Wei (1995) also show that the average annual GNP growth rates and industrial gross output 
value in the inland regions have been lower than in the coastal regions since 1980. 
14 List and Gallet (1999), using a panel of 71 countries from 1961 to 1992, also show that inequality 
increases in the most advanced countries when the industrial structure shifts from manufacturing to a 
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where PD is a provincial dummy variable that takes value of 1 if one province belongs 
to Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, taking otherwise the value of 0. If a structural 
difference exists in terms of the effects of financial intermediation due to geographic 
location, then we expect the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms to be 
statistically significant. The results are reported in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. 
In Table 7, after controlling for the PD dummy and its interaction term of FINDEV, we 
obtain results similar to those given in the previous tables, i.e., the estimated 
coefficients of FINDEV are still positive and statistically significant (columns 1 and 2), 
and this statistical significance level is mainly due to its significant effects in the 1990s 
(columns 5 and 6). Correspondingly, the estimated coefficients of the fiscal expenditure 
ratio to GDP (FISCAL/GDP) become significant only in the 1980s. These results are 
highly consistent with those given in Tables 3-6. In addition, the interaction terms are 
significantly negative only in the regressions using the subperiod sample for the 1980s, 
implying that loans extended during this period through financial intermediation in 
Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai tended to reduce RUID. However, this effect faded in the 
1990s. Finally, the U-curve relationship between per capita GDP and RUID occurred 
only in the 1990s.  
Table 8 presents the estimated results for equation (6.3). Similar to the results in 
Table 7, FINDEV has significant coefficients for the 1990s, but loses significance in 
results for the 1980s. Other interaction terms are not significant in most regression 
results. In the meanwhile, the estimated coefficients of FISCAL/GDP are significant 
only in the 1980s. The economic structure variable, AGR/GDP, remains significant in 
most regressions. Moreover, the estimated coefficients of the per capita GDP and its 
square term are no longer significant in most regressions.  
To sum up, based on the results from the regression models, we find that the expansion 
of the loan size of financial intermediation sharply increases the income disparity 
between rural and urban residents, after controlling for income level and other 
explanatory variables and taking the potential endogeneity problem into account. More 
importantly, the effects of financial intermediation were not significant until the 1990s. 
The results strongly support our assumption that in the 1980s, provincial governments 
used fiscal policy for economic intervention rather than relying on financial 
intermediation in order to realize its policy intentions. In other words, the changes in the 
role of financial intermediation and finance with regard to their effects on RUID in  
the different periods reflect their importance as government policy tools for regulating 




7  Has the Kuznets effect occurred during the period? 
One of the key assumptions of the Kuznets hypothesis on the convergence of inequality 
between sectors is the difference in the levels of rural and urban inequality. Kuznets 
postulates that an urban setting has higher growth and higher inequality than rural areas.  
The development of government policies in China may possibly have affected intra-
urban, inter-urban, as well as rural-urban inequality.15 The uneven distribution of 
financial intermediation in China has coincided with changes in its economic 
development policies. This uneven development may resemble the GDP divergence of 
different countries, which makes it difficult for cross-section studies to highlight a 
definite relationship between growth and distribution (Kanbur 2000: 7). 
Using China as a country case, we find (as shown in Tables 4-8), that the Kuznets effect 
may have occurred during the first period, 1978-88, which was characterized by rapid 
agricultural and TVE development as well as underdevelopment of financial 
intermediation in urban centres. In particular, the coefficients of square term of 
Ln(PERGDP) in the first period are higher than those of the pool sample in each 
estimation. This is consistent with the recent history of agricultural development in 
China.  
The financial intermediation FINDEV has a stronger positive effect in the second period 
than the pooled sample among those estimations (in the third column). Moreover, we 
find that the (Ln(PERGDP))
2 effect turns positive. The logic could well be that urban 
inequality changed the position of the curve from convergent to divergent effect.16 The 
slope of the (Ln(PERGDP))
2 now shifted from the right side (negative slope) of   
the Kuznets curve to the left side (positive slope). That is, the level of inequality during 
the second period may resemble the initial assumption of economic growth in the 
Kuznets curve, i.e., high growth and high inequality in urban settings.17 The liquidity 
constraint of TVEs and other agricultural businesses may intensify RUID: low relative 
income in rural areas.18  
In sum, the significant shift of the Kuzents curve may well represent the sharp 
differences in the source of growth. Growth in the first period may reflect development 
of the agricultural sector, including agricultural production and TVEs. However, growth 
                                                 
15 Riskin, Renwei and Li (2001) provide a thoughtful selection of papers on inequality in China.  
16  Knight, Shi and Renwei (2003) use a ten-province survey data conducted in 1988 and 1995 to analyse 
the convergence in urban inequality in two different levels: the intra-provincial and intra-city 
inequality. Using a decomposition analysis, they show a general trend of rising and converging intra-
provincial inequality. However, the mean earnings per worker and mean household income per capita, 
while rising in each province, show a diverging trend across provinces. 
17 Using 1988 and 1995 CASS national household cross-section surveys on ten provinces, Khan, Griffin 
and Riskin (2001) show that urban inequality has increased. The basic problem is that government 
policies have failed to address urban issues such as urban poverty, social safety nets, ration coupons, 
subsidies, housing, and inequality due to marketization (Khan, Griffin and Riskin 2001: 131).  
18 Using the same dataset as Khan, Griffin and Riskin (2001), Gustafsson and Li (2001) show that while 
overall inequality increased in 1995, also intra-rural, intra-urban, rural-urban, and inter-regional 
inequality increased as well.    
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during the second period may have been largely driven by financial expansion induced 
by the monopoly banking system. 
8 Conclusion 
Using China as a case, we show in this paper how financial intermediation affects the 
rural-urban inequality disparity (RUID). We argue that the monopolized banking market 
structure and central government regulations with regard to rural economy may affect 
the formal financial agencies’ efficiency and incentive to provide financial support to 
rural sectors. On the one hand, the central government has increased its reliance on the 
banking system since late the 1980s as an instrument to regulate the economy more than 
other fiscal measures. On the other hand, due to strict regulation, informal financial 
agencies in rural areas are under-funded. As a result, the development of financial 
intermediation in China may enlarge the gap between rural versus urban financial 
development.  
To support the above argument, we use panel data for 28 provinces for the period of 
1978-98 to empirically test the relationship between the development of financial 
intermediation and RUID in China. We show that the urban-biased development of 
financial intermediation contributes significantly to the RUID increase. The results are 
robust to the controls for the endogeneity issues.  
We also analyse the dataset by dividing it into two subperiods, 1978-88 and 1989-98. 
While central government used fiscal measures to regulate the economy in the first 
period, the focus shifted to an increased use of its banking system during the second 
period. We show that the Kuznets curve, a negative relationship between the squared 
GDP and RUID, may have occurred during the 1978-88, a decade of rapid agricultural 
growth and the development of the TVEs. However, the effect changed during the years 
1989-98, a decade of high urban growth and urban inequality. Both urban-biased 
financial intermediation and limited liquidity in rural areas in unison may have changed 
the fundamentals of RUID. Moreover, we find neither the interaction term of the 
provincial financial intermediation loan ratio with the size of the modern sector nor the 
interaction term of the loan ratio with the size of non-state industrial production to be 
significant in explaining RUID. These statistical results also remain stable after 
controlling for potential structural differences between the three municipalities and 
other provinces. This study adds to the literature on economic inequality by clarifying 
the effects of government policies on the underlying dynamics of the convergent and 
divergent effects on rural-urban inequality. 
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Appendix 1: Financial structure in China during the 1990s 
The most important characteristic of China’s centralized financial structure is its highly 
controlled and monopolized bank-based financial structure that is concentrated in urban 
areas. Small- and medium-scale farmer households and small- and medium- scale 
township and village enterprises are overlooked in the system. 
The securities market plays a relatively minor role in financing the overall economy of 
China and is still underdeveloped. For example, although growth of the securities 
market has been faster than that of financial intermediation during the entire 1990s, 
China still maintains a bank-based financial structure in which the four state-owned 
commercial banks together account for two-thirds of financial assets and provide more 
than six times the funds that securities market does (IFC 2000). 
The credit market in China is dominated by the four big SCBs (Table 2). Among these 
state-owned commercial banks, only the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) is vested 
with the responsibility of providing loans to the agricultural sector. But in practice, 
farmers do not get financial support directly from ABC; instead, farm loans are handled 
by the rural credit cooperatives rather than the ABC. 
The state monopolized banking market structure has been a convenient vehicle for the 
central government to direct credits to large SOEs (Zhang 2002).19 Furthermore, given 
the imperfect credit monitoring system in China, smaller financial institutions enjoy an 
informational advantage over large banks when it comes to lending to the SMEs 
(Levonian and Soller 1995; Berger and Udell 1995; Peek and Rosengren 1996; Strahan 
and Weston 1996, 1998). Empirical researchers also find that large banks have no 
comparative advantage in providing funds to SMEs (Lin, Zhang and Liu 2003; Meyer 
1998). Since agricultural activity is hard to supervise, the problem of asymmetry of 
information between farmers and financial intermediation are more severe. In such 
cases, large banks are unwilling to provide loans to farmers or TVEs, which normally 
are of medium- or small-scale and lack reliable credit history. In contrast, large 
enterprises, usually concentrated in the urban areas, can get financial resources more 
easily from the large banks. This means that even if government regulations on financial 
intermediation were removed, the urban bias of financial intermediation would not 
disappear.  
The state monopolized banking market structure, however, gas experienced a declining 
budgetary capacity and has lost control over its resources since the 1980s. In order to 
finance its policies, and to support SOEs, central government extended its control over 
the financial system, which includes measures such as maintaining the interest ceiling, 
providing policy loans, and introducing a quota system in the securities market 
(abolished in 2001).  
                                                 
19 China’s highly monopolized bank-based financial structure has a long history. From 1949 to 1952, 
China nationalized the whole banking industry and closed financial markets. All banks were merged 
with the People’s Bank of China, the only bank left on mainland China, so that credit allocation was 
highly centralized in order to be easily assigned to priority sectors based on the national development 
strategy. Banking industry reform in the early 1980s led to the establishment of the four state-owned 
commercials banks, which have dominated financial intermediation market since then. A highly 
monopolized banking market structure makes it possible and easy for the government to exert control 
over the banking industry to direct the allocation of loans (Zhang 2002).  
20 
The level of financial development in China was relatively low during the 1980s, with 
bank deposits constituting the only financial assets. At that time, in order to promote 
reform and adjust its economy, the government saw no other choice but to rely mainly 
on fiscal policy such as raising the prices of principal agricultural products in 1979, 
increasing salaries and subsidies to urban residents, and providing low-cost or even no-
cost resources to finance SOEs. 
But the situation changed substantially later in the decade. After implementing a series 
of decentralizing reforms on the fiscal system and on SOEs in the 1980s, the 
government’s possibility to use fiscal policy to adjust its economy was limited.   
The financial system, however, is still under tight regulation and controls are used by 
the state as a means of providing financial support to the large SOEs,20 most of which 
are capital-intensive and large-scale firms.21 In addition, government fiscal ratio to GDP 
at the province level has been declining since the beginning of the reform (Figure 3), 
and cheap bank loans (as well as equity market funds in the late 1990s) have become the 
principal tool of the cash-strapped government to support state-owned enterprises.22 
Figure 4 shows that during the 1980s, there was a positive correlation between the loans 
by financial intermediation and per capita GDP (FINDEV) at the province level, which 
is consistent with the results in the literature in the context of cross-country comparison. 
It was during the 1990s that the credit lending level in the lowest-income provinces 
began to raise. It is likely that in the relatively underdeveloped provinces, financial 
intermediation was used as the primary tool by local governments for economic 
intervention.  
With more funds being directed by the government to meet the financial demands of the 
large SOEs, it is obvious that farmers and TVEs were more financially constrained, 
which would be detrimental to RUID. 
Appendix 2:  Government regulations on the rural financial system 
Relying on the four state-owned commercial banks that dominate the banking market, 
the government has been successfully in directing most of the credit to the large SOEs. 
Rural finance is handled by the formal financial agencies in the countryside, such as the 
ABC and the RCCs, which are responsible for providing financial services to farmers. 
                                                 
20    According to the IFC report (2000), in the period from 1991-97, the share of investment in the 
national total was in the range of 15-27 per cent, with scant resources targeted to formal bank loans 
(less than 1 per cent of working capital loans went to private sectors). In addition, private-firm access 
to the equity market was also restricted by requirements on size and the quota system. The IFC (2000) 
reports that out of the 976 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, only 11 
are non-state firms, while in 1998 and 1999 only 4 non-state IPOs (initial public offerings) took place. 
21 For example, the State Economy and Trade Commission was set up in the early 1990s to cooperate 
with State Planning Commission of China and the Ministry of Finance of China to implement 
industrial policies. The most famous policy is the so-called ‘guarantee big firms and leave tiny firms 
alone’, with its key goal to guarantee the development of the 500 super-big firms selected by the State 
Economy and Trade Commission and State Planning Commission of China. 
22  Until 2000, SOEs still accounted for over one-half of outstanding bank credit.  
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Hampered by regulations and government disincentives, these agencies are 
ineffective.23 These disincentives take two forms. 
First, although market reform has made great progress in the countryside, the central 
government regulations imposed on rural society and economy—such as compulsory 
grain procurement, family planning and nine-year compulsory education—are still 
maintained. This not only adds to the burden of the peasants, but also prevents them 
from exploiting their comparative advantage through production structure adjustment 
(Tao, Liu and Zhang 2003). Consequently, these regulations may increase the likelihood 
of low returns from agriculture. 
Policy trends in the countryside prior to the mid-1980s could be viewed as market-
oriented or deregulation-oriented. These included measures such as abolishing the 
commune system, promoting the household responsibility system, giving farmers more 
autonomy to manage production, relinquishing control over prices of many agricultural 
products (except grain and cotton), opening agricultural products markets and factor 
markets, and even an one-time attempt to cancel the compulsory procurement of grain.  
These measures were accompanied by rapid economic growth, but the good times did 
not last. Since the late 1980s, many of those pro-agricultural policies have been 
gradually reversed. We can see the change by tracking the grain policy in the 1990s. In 
1990 the contract sale of grain was replaced with compulsory government procurement 
so that in practice contracted grain sales became mandatory for the peasants; in 1994, 
procurement and wholesale grain purchases were exclusively managed by state-owned 
grain firms; in 1995 the central government initiated reform of the food circulation 
system and began to stress food autarky within the provinces. All of these policies 
intensified the impact of the regulations on the rural economy. 
Second, since the late 1980s, in order to improve their promotion possibilities, local 
officials became interested in various ‘image projects’, including the establishment of 
industrial firms regardless of local conditions or local comparative advantage. In reality, 
many of these firms proved to be loss-making, and since many had been started with 
bank loans, they resulted in considerable bad debt.  
The consequences are twofold: (i) having accumulated bad loans, the financial position 
of rural financial agencies became worse, and (ii) there was an outflow of rural financial 
resources for off-farm activities. Rural funds were not reinvested in agricultural sectors, 
but were instead diverted to real estate or equity markets in urban areas.24 The outflow 
                                                 
23  Song (2000), for instance, points out that the average growth rate of total agricultural loans as a whole 
was less than 2 per cent per year. The ratio of new added agricultural loans to total loans was also less 
than 10 per cent. Chen (2002) finds in his survey that basic financial services for rural residents not 
only declined, but also that funds for productive and commercial activities were smaller than before. 
Moreover, because state-owned commercial banks have been closing down their county-level branch 
offices in the late 1990s, the RCCs alone cannot assume responsibility for providing financial services 
for rural development because of its large portfolio of bad loans accumulated over last two decades. In 
Liu’s (2002) survey on county finance, rural financial agencies were concerned over the huge bad 
loans and tremendous losses. He concludes that because credit policies were tightened after stated-
owned banks were commercialized, county-level economic activities are more constrained financially. 
24  He (2003) summarizes the channels of outflow of rural funds. One such channel is through the branch 
offices of state-owned commercials banks, and rural post-office saving banks pooling funds for 
deposit with higher level banks. Rural funds also flow out through the RCCs every year, in the form of 
deposit reserves going to the central bank, the purchase of public debts and financial bonds, etc. He  
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of funds from the countryside was particularly prominent around the year 1994 when 
the Chinese economy overheated. But once the macroeconomic policy environment 
tightened after 1994, the majority of funds invested in real estate and equity market 
turned into bad debt. 
Even on the part of loans intended for agricultural sectors, scant amounts were actually 
received by the farmers. The Agricultural Bank of China, for instance, has no face-to-
face contact with the farmers, but prioritizes its business instead with the state-owned 
agricultural commercial firms and the TVEs. ABC loans are mainly used for large 
infrastructure projects, purchasing public debts, and protecting the environment. But for 
the agricultural enterprises in urgent need of financial support, ABC loans have been 
retrograding (Chen 2002). The rural credit cooperatives of China are another formal 
financial agency lending directly to farm households. However, the role of the RCCs in 
meeting the farmers’ financial demand is limited for several reasons.  First, the RCCs 
are only ‘cooperative’ in the nominal sense; in practice, these still operate as a state-
owned agency. Thus their operations are often government directed so that they fund 
ventures rather than provide financial services to agriculture and farmers. Loans 
provided through administrative intervention usually become bad loans in the end, 
greatly damaging the financial position of the RCCs. According to the estimate of the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC), the RCCs’ portfolio of accumulated bad loans has 
reached hundred one billion yuan and the non-performing loan (NPL) rate is much 
higher than that of the four state-owned commercial banks. Usually the NPL ratio is 
above 50 per cent, but in some economically underdeveloped provinces, it exceeds 90 
per cent. Furthermore, because of the commercialization reform, the RCCs pay more 
attention in their operations to loan quality and profit orientation. Because the relative 
returns on agricultural activities are kept artificially low, the RCCs have no actual 
incentive to extend loans to the sector, as is indicated by its minimal loans targeted to 
the rural economy. Many case studies also indicate that regardless of their location in 
the economically developed regions and coastal provinces, or in the central and western 
hinterlands, the RCCs show a strong urban bias in their loan orientation.25 Finally, the 
RCCs have a monopolistic position in the rural financial markets, thus they lack the 
incentive to improve management or control financial risks. 
It is difficult for the farmers to obtain adequate financial services from the formal 
financial agencies, so they primarily turn to the informal channels. Based on data from a 
rural fixed point survey, which cover 20,294 farm households, Cao (2002) notes that in 
1999, rural informal credit market accounted for 69.41 per cent of total loans borrowed, 
averaging 1008.56 yuan per household. 
                                                                                                                                               
estimates that in 2001 funds flowing out from the countryside via state-owned commercial banks and 
post banks totalled 30 billion yuan and 59.11 billion yuan, respectively. Ma (2001: 133) also estimates 
that about 20 billion yuan per year have left the countryside since the 1990s. 
25 According to IFDA (2002), the RCCs covered only 20 per cent of loans of the poorest farmers. Many 
case studies also note that the RCC operations are exhibiting greater urban bias, with more loans 
going to urban areas, more city-residents being hired as employees, and more subsidiaries being 
located in towns. This is true, regardless of whether the RCCs were located in the highly developed 
regions or the inner-country provinces or some of eastern provinces where agriculture constitutes the 
comparative advantage (Sheng 2001).  
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However, concerned over the financial risks involved, monetary authorities are dubious 
of the development of informal finance, and are even opposing it. For example, the rural 
credit foundations (RCFs), an informal financial agency active in rural areas, was 
ordered to discontinue operations in 1999, which led to a gap of 300 billion yuan 
between monetary supply and demand in the countryside (Chen 2002). 
Overall, in the early 1980s, when regulations on rural economy were eased off, output 
of grain production and net income per capita of peasants increased rapidly.26 As a 
result, RUID dropped during this period (Figure 1).   
However, since the mid-1980s, the effect of pro-agriculture institutional reforms was 
exhausted, while other policies detrimental to rural economic development essentially 
were not changed at all. With regard to financial development, most credit was allocated 
to the large SOEs through the state-owned banking system. In contrast, both the highly 
monopolized banking market structure and artificially low return of agriculture have had 
a negative impact on the farmers’ ability to secure funds from the formal financial 
institutions. Furthermore, these formal financial agencies have, in fact, become the 
channel of funds flowing out from the rural areas. Even these non-official financial 
agencies are under strict regulation so that they are unable to provide sufficient financial 
services to farmers. Thus, overall financial development in China will probably mean 
that the gap between rural financial development and urban financial development is 
widening, and as a result, RUID has increased. As shown, the Chinese government has 
relied more and more on the financial system to intervene in the economy since the 
1990s. 
Appendix 3: Definition of the variables and data sources 
Dependent variable 
RUID  ratio of urban per capita disposable income to rural per capita net income.  
Explanation variables: 
PERGDP   real per capita GDP at provincial level;  
FINDEV   ratio of loans extended by financial intermediation in one province to 
its GDP;  
AGRFINDEV   share of loans to agriculture sectors in total loans;  
REFORM  the proportion of farm households that adopt household responsibility 
system in a province;  
EXPORT/GDP  ratio of total value of export to GDP at province level;  
FDI/GDP   ratio of FDI to GDP at province level;  
                                                 
26 According to the calculations of the authors, the growth rate of agriculture and net income per capita 
of the peasants (in 1950 prices) averaged 7.7 per cent and 14.4 per cent per year, respectively, for the 
period of 1978-84. Lin et al. (1988) find agricultural TFP (total factor productivity) increased 
considerably versus the pre-reform periods.  
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FISCAL_AGR  share of fiscal funds for supporting agricultural production in total 
fiscal expenditures;  
FISCAL/GDP  ratio of fiscal expenditures to GDP; 
AGR/GDP   share of primary industry’s GDP in total GDP at province level; 
PD  provincial dummy = 1 if provinces are Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin; 
otherwise = 0. 
Data sources 
The Compilation of Statistic Data of New China for 1978-1999. Beijing: Chinese 
Statistics Press (2000). 
Mingxing Liu (2002) ‘Data for Chinese Economic Growth and Development: 1970-
1998’. Available at: www.fed.org.cn.  
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Figures and tables 
Figure 1 shows that provincial level rural-urban income disparity declined in the early 
1980s, but increased again from the late 1980s onward. 
Figure 1 
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Note:   RUID is measured as the ratio of urban disposal income per capita to the rural per capita net 
income. 







Figure 2 shows a negative correlation between the average rural-urban income inequity 
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Figure 3 shows that the ratio of government revenue to GDP at the province level has 
been declining since the beginning of reforms. 
 
Figure 3 
Ratio of government revenue to GDP at province level 
 
 









Per capita GDP and the development of financial intermediation at province level 
 
Note:   Development of the financial intermediation index is measured as the logged value of the ratio of 
loans of state financial intermediation to GDP in a province; per capita GDP is also in logarithmic 
forms.  













 of China 
Construction 
Bank of China  Total 
Proportion of asset value in total asset 
value of banks in China 
      
1994 34.18  16.26  23.85 18.13  92.42 
1996 34.59  13.98  20.08 20.26  88.92 
1997 34.13  13.69  19.04 26.33  93.19 
Proportion of profit value in total profit 
value of banks in China 
      
1994 19.4  2.41  24.82 12.8  59.43 
1996 12.73  10.25  25.36 10.59  58.93 
1997 11.04  2.84  21.25 6.79  41.92 
Proportion of deposit in total deposit 
of banks in China 
      
1996 27.37  13.11  18.02 15.39  73.89 
1997 27.32  13.47  16.7 15.89  73.38 
Proportion of loans in total loans 
of banks in China 
      
1996 28.03  13.34  16.54 14.22  72.13 
1997 26.63  13.09  15.05 14.8  69.57 
Source:    CCER (2000). 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics (average values, 1978-98) 
  RUID PERGDP FINDEV AGRFINDEV FISCAL_AGR REFORM EXPORT/GDP
Mean 2.21  1193.6  0.74  0.09 0.02 0.80  0.11 
MAX 3.04  5652.5  1.08  1.04 0.05 0.86  0.45 
MIN 1.45  400.3  0.45  0.01 0.002  0.69  0.03 
Std dev.  0.44  1055.8  0.16 0.19  0.01  0.03  0.10 





Financial intermediation and ln(RUID) 
Baseline model (1978-98, full sample) 
 OLS  SYS-GMM  OLS  SYS-GMM 
Ln(PERGDP) 0.74***  0.73**  1.02***  0.99** 
  (4.38) (2.15) (4.45) (2.46) 
Ln(PERGDP)
2  -0.05*** -0.05**  -0.07*** -0.07** 
  (4.34) (2.17) (4.64) (2.73) 
FINDEV  0.14*** 0.14  0.24*** 0.22* 
  (2.27) (1.44) (3.59) (1.96) 
AGRFINDEV  0.27 0.25 0.24 0.16 
  (1.12) (0.60) (1.01) (0.37) 
REFORM     -0.10*  -0.09 
     (1.80)  (1.59) 
EXPORT/GDP     0.07  0.08 
     (1.09)  (0.75) 
FDI/GDP     0.76*  0.72 
     (1.90)  (1.42) 
FISCAL_AGR     -0.23  -0.19 
     (0.94)  (0.67) 
FISCAL/GDP     0.82***  0.86** 
     (3.29)  (2.28) 
Obs  506 506 490 490 
Adj-R
2  0.89  0.90  
Hansen test sig    1.00    1.00 
AR(2) test sig    0.38    0.16 
Notes:   Numbers below estimated coefficients are robust standard errors. 
  *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% significant level. 
  RUID is the ratio of urban per capita disposable income to rural per capita net income; 
  PERGDP is the real per capita GDP at provincial level; 
 (Ln(PERGDP))2 is the square term of Ln(PERGDP);  
  FINDEV is the ratio of loans extended by financial intermediation in one province to its GDP:  
  AGRFINDEV is the share of loans to agriculture sectors in total loans;  
  REFORM is the proportion of farm households that adopt household responsibility system in a 
province; 
  EXPORT/GDP is the ratio of total value of export to GDP at province level; 
  FDI/GDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP at province level; 
  FISCAL_AGR is the share of fiscal funds for supporting agricultural production in total fiscal 
expenditures; 




Financial intermediation and ln(RUID): 
Subsample model (1978-89) 
  OLS SYS-GMM OLS SYS-GMM 
Ln(PERGDP)  1.54*** 1.67*** 1.80*** 1.88*** 
  (5.90) (3.73) (5.44) (3.91) 
Ln(PERGDP)
2  -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.15*** 
  (6.45) (4.30) (6.10) (4.59) 
FINDEV  0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 
  (0.29) (0.11) (0.32) (0.07) 
AGRFINDEV  0.40 0.51 0.31 0.22 
  (1.34) (1.45) (1.04) (0.72) 
REFORM     -0.08*  -0.07* 
     (1.75)  (1.69) 
EXPORT/GDP     -0.43*  -0.55** 
     (1.66)  (2.15) 
FDI/GDP     2.65**  3.02** 
     (2.26)  (2.50) 
FISCAL_AGR     -0.35**  -0.35* 
     (2.03)  (1.85) 
FISCAL/GDP     0.89***  0.83** 
     (3.05)  (2.23) 
      
Obs 268  268 254 254 
Adj-R
2  0.90   0.91  
Hansen test sig    1.00  1.00 
AR(2) test sig    0.66  0.88 




















Table 5  
Financial intermediation and ln(RUID) 
Subsample model (1990-98) 
  OLS SYS-GMM OLS SYS-GMM 
Ln(PERGDP)  -1.37*** -0.97*** -1.04*** -0.94** 
  4.61 3.59 3.22 2.26 
Ln(PERGDP)
2  0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06** 
  5.14 3.72 3.54 2.59 
FINDEV  0.38*** 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.32** 
  4.71 3.75 4.96 2.62 
AGRFINDEV  -0.89*  -0.56 -0.50 -0.49 
  1.96 0.69 1.02 0.58 
REFORM     -- -- 
     -- -- 
EXPORT/GDP     -0.02  0.01 
     0.30  0.11 
FDI/GDP     0.87**  0.74 
     2.28  1.62 
FISCAL_AGR     -4.36  -3.98 
     0.94  0.87 
FISCAL/GDP     0.16  0.30 
     0.51  0.67 
      
Obs  238 238 236 236 
Adj-R
2  0.95  0.95  
Hansen test sig    1.00    1 
AR(2) test sig    0.46    0.50 
Notes:   Numbers below estimated coefficients are robust standard errors; 
   *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% significant level: 
  RUID is the ratio of urban per capita disposable income to rural per capita net income; 
  PERGDP is the real per capita GDP at provincial level; 
 (Ln(PERGDP))2 is the square term of Ln(PERGDP);  
  FINDEV is the ratio of loans extended by financial intermediation in one province to its GDP:  
  AGRFINDEV is the share of loans to agriculture sectors in total loans;  
  REFORM is the proportion of farm households that adopt household responsibility system in a 
province; 
  EXPORT/GDP is the ratio of total value of export to GDP at province level; 
  FDI/GDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP at province level; 
 FISCAL_AGR is the share of fiscal funds for supporting agricultural production in total fiscal 
expenditures; 
  FISCAL/GDP is the ratio of fiscal expenditures to GDP. 
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Table 6  
Financial intermediation and ln(RUID):  
Considering economic structure in the model 
  Full sample    Subperiod: 1978-89    Subperiod: 1990-98 
 OLS  SYS-GMM  OLS SYS-GMM  OLS SYS-GMM
Ln(PERGDP) 0.15  0.12  1.43***  1.66** -1.73***  -1.50*** 
 0.57  0.29  3.02  2.61 6.17  6.58 
Ln(PERGDP)
2  -0.03 -0.02  -0.12***  -0.15*** 0.10***  0.09*** 
 1.49  0.88  3.62  3.05 6.04  5.90 
FINDEV  0.21* 0.20  0.16  0.23 0.43***  0.47*** 
 1.79  1.34  1.17  1.48 4.80  3.63 
AGR/GDP  -2.04*** -2.07***  -1.01**  -0.85  -1.80*** -2.0*** 
 6.71  5.21  2.06  1.38 4.59  4.02 
AGR/GDP*FINDEV  0.60 0.59  -0.31  -0.73 -0.15  -0.13 
 1.62  1.16  0.52  0.96 0.46  0.29 
AGRFINDEV  0.31 0.21  0.29 0.15 -0.34  0.09 
 1.29  0.53  0.99  0.49 -0.62  0.15 
REFORM  0.00 0.01  -0.03 0.00     
  0.08 0.29  0.60 0.15  .   
EXPORT/GDP  0.04 0.04  -0.66**  -0.83*** -0.08 -0.08 
 0.60  0.40  2.37  3.88 0.99  0.87 
FDI/GDP  1.16*** 1.13**  3.45*** 3.91*** 1.23***  1.27 
 2.94  2.14  2.95  3.29 3.41  3.15 
FISCAL_AGR  -0.10 -0.04  -0.37*  -0.40* -4.57  -6.87* 
 0.44  0.17  1.95  1.94 1.15  1.73 
FISCAL/GDP  0.69*** 0.73**  0.64**  0.54 -0.16  -0.14 
 2.91  2.40  2.04  1.62 0.90  0.73 
Obs  470 470    243 243    227 227 
Adj-R
2  0.91     0.92     0.96  
Hansen  test  sig   1.00     1.00     1.00 
AR(2)  test  sig   0.25     0.84     0.37 
Notes:   Numbers below estimated coefficients are robust standard errors; 
   *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% significant level: 
  RUID is the ratio of urban per capita disposable income to rural per capita net income; 
  PERGDP is the real per capita GDP at provincial level; 
 (Ln(PERGDP))2 is the square term of Ln(PERGDP);  
  FINDEV is the ratio of loans extended by financial intermediation in one province to its GDP:  
  AGRFINDEV is the share of loans to agriculture sectors in total loans;  
  REFORM is the proportion of farm households that adopt household responsibility system in a 
province; 
  EXPORT/GDP is the ratio of total value of export to GDP at province level; 
  FDI/GDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP at province level; 
 FISCAL_AGR is the share of fiscal funds for supporting agricultural production in total fiscal 
expenditures; 
  FISCAL/GDP is the ratio of fiscal expenditures to GDP; 
  AGR/GDP is the share of primary industry’s GDP in total GDP at province level; 




Financial intermediation and ln(RUID):  
Considering structural differences between provinces (I) 
  Full sample    Subperiod: 1978-89    Subperiod: 1990-98 
 OLS  SYS-GMM  OLS SYS-GMM  OLS SYS-GMM 
Ln(PERGDP) 0.07  0.07  -0.26  -0.27 -0.92***  -0.82* 
 (0.25)  (0.14)  (0.36)  (0.27) (2.76)  (1.89) 
Ln(PERGDP)
2  -0.01 -0.01  0.01  0.01 0.05***  0.04* 
 (0.70)  (0.40)  (0.10)  (0.08) (2.59)  (1.75) 
FINDEV  0.20*** 0.20*  0.16  0.16 0.43***  0.29** 
  (2.70) (1.77)  (0.80) (1.03) (3.97)  (2.07) 
PD*FINDEV  -0.08 -0.08  -0.52*  -0.52* -0.02  0.10 
  (0.53) (0.42)  (1.91) (1.78) (0.16)  (0.60) 
PD  -0.39* -0.26  0.37 0.44  0.12  -0.08 
  (1.81) (0.72)  (0.84) (1.33) (0.70)  (0.38) 
AGRFINDEV  -0.09 -0.09  -0.16 -0.16 -0.32  -0.33 
  (0.29) (0.15)  (0.53) (0.50) (0.58)  (0.38) 
REFORM  -0.32* -0.32  -0.31* -0.31*     
  (1.73) (1.52)  (1.75) (1.74)  .   
EXPORT/GDP  0.03 0.03  0.18 0.18 -0.07  -0.02 
  (0.49) (0.38)  (0.65) (0.60) (0.72)  (0.18) 
FDI/GDP  0.56 0.56  -3.06**  -3.06** 1.09***  1.08* 
  (1.47) (1.06)  (2.01) (2.22) (2.67)  (2.38) 
FISCAL_AGR  -3.94 -3.94  2.13  2.13 0.38  -0.78 
  (1.10) (0.87)  (0.65) (0.63) (0.09)  (0.17) 
FISCAL/GDP  0.85 0.85  1.43*  1.43* 0.15  0.25 
 (1.57)  (1.26)  (1.80)  (2.00) (0.41)  (0.52) 
          
Obs  370 370    134 134    236 236 
Adj-R
2  0.93     0.95     0.95  
Hansen  test  sig   1.00     1.00     1.00 
AR(2)  test  sig   0.19     0.10     0.45 
Notes:   Numbers below estimated coefficients are robust standard errors; 
   *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% significant level: 
  RUID is the ratio of urban per capita disposable income to rural per capita net income; 
  PERGDP is the real per capita GDP at provincial level; 
 (Ln(PERGDP))2 is the square term of Ln(PERGDP);  
  FINDEV is the ratio of loans extended by financial intermediation in one province to its GDP:  
  AGRFINDEV is the share of loans to agriculture sectors in total loans;  
 REFORM is the proportion of farm households that adopt household responsibility system in a 
province; 
 EXPORT/GDP is the ratio of total value of export to GDP at province level; 
 FDI/GDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP at province level; 
 FISCAL_AGR is the share of fiscal funds for supporting agricultural production in total fiscal 
expenditures; 
 FISCAL/GDP is the ratio of fiscal expenditures to GDP; 
  PD is the dummy variable for three municipalities; 
  PD*FINDEV is the interaction term of PD and FINDEV. 
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Table 8  
Financial intermediation and ln(RUID):  
Considering structural differences between provinces (II) 
  Full sample    Subperiod: 1978-89    Subperiod: 1990-98 
  OLS SYS-GMM  OLS SYS-GMM  OLS SYS-GMM
Ln(PERGDP) -0.69*** 0.16  -0.31  -0.31 -1.52***  -0.70 
 (2.62)  (0.31)  (0.36)  (0.28) (4.85)  (0.54) 
Ln(PERGDP)
2  0.02 -0.02  -0.01 -0.01 0.07***  0.03 
 (1.24)  (0.56)  (0.17)  (0.13) (4.00)  (0.35) 
FINDEV  0.13 0.49*  0.30 0.30 0.45**  0.56** 
 (0.87)  (1.94)  (0.72)  (0.80) (2.42)  (2.11) 
PD*FINDEV  0.08 -0.06  -0.52 -0.52 0.00  0.13 
 (0.43)  (0.20)  (1.06)  (1.07) (0.01)  (0.47) 
PD*(AGR/GDP*FINDEV)  -2.60*** -0.75 -2.73  -2.73 -0.92  -1.02 
 (2.66)  (0.32)  (1.15)  (1.23) (0.89)  (0.29) 
AGR_GDP*FINDEV  0.55 0.0006  -0.57  -0.57 -0.24  0.01 
 (1.11)  (0.00)  (0.39)  (0.40) (0.40)  (0.01) 
PD  -0.12 -0.55*** 0.67  0.67 -0.62***  -0.42 
 (0.57)  (2.82)  (1.10)  (1.11) (3.53)  (1.23) 
AGR/GDP  -2.44*** -2.06*** -0.44  -0.44 -1.79***  -2.44***
 (6.05)  (3.88)  (0.33)  (0.31) (3.32)  (3.08) 
AGRFINDEV  0.09 0.25  -0.15  -0.15 -0.15  1.08 
 (0.30)  (0.61)  (0.50)  (0.59) (0.24)  (1.48) 
REFORM  -0.04 0.21  -0.12  -0.12     
  (0.22) (0.96)  (0.59) (0.51)  .   
EXPORT/GDP  0.04 -0.03  0.28  0.28 -0.12  -0.17 
 (0.60)  (0.30)  (0.97)  (0.81) (1.39)  (1.44) 
FDI/GDP  0.69* 1.79*** -2.26 -2.26 1.32***  2.12***
 (1.98)  (3.43)  (1.47)  (1.49) (3.43)  (8.13) 
FISCAL_AGR  -2.29 -3.01  0.14  0.14 0.19  -5.51 
 (0.73)  (0.80)  (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05)  (1.12) 
FISCAL/GDP  0.48 0.47  1.28*  1.28** -0.16  -0.28 
 (1.16)  (0.91)  (1.99)  (2.24) (0.73)  (0.78) 
Obs  357 357    130 130    227 227 
Adj-R
2  0.95     0.96     0.96  
Hansen  test  sig   1.00     1.00     1.00 
AR(2)  test  sig   0.73     0.23     0.64 
Notes:   See Table 7. 
 
 